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Abstract:   
Emergency response combines with prevention and mitigation to form the risk management triad of 
control measures for reducing chemical accident risks. In fact, standard good practice dictates that 
appropriate emergency response measures are identified for every major accident scenario of a 
hazardous operation.  Consistent with this philosophy, emergency planning has been taken on board as an 
essential component of the Seveso Directive since its inception in 1982.  Within the current Seveso 
Directive (2012/18/EU), under Article 12, emergency planning for upper-tier sites is assigned as a direct 
obligation to both the operator (for internal emergency planning) and the authorities (for external 
emergency planning). These obligations present considerable challenges for the authorities, in particular, 
in verifying that internal emergency planning of each upper tier site is conducted in accordance with 
Seveso requirements and  existing performance standard; that a parallel process for external emergency 
planning is established; and an appropriate strategy is defined to inform populations potentially at risk 
from the accident scenarios of concern.  To bring improvements and consistency to Member State 
practices in this regard, the European Commission and the Irish Health and Safety Authority organised a 
workshop in 2012 for Seveso inspectors from EU and aligned countries to exchange information on 
challenges and successes in implementing emergency planning obligations.  This publication summarizes 
the main conclusions and observations from the workshop discussions. 
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PREFACE 
The inspection function has always been considered 
one of the most powerful and dynamic tools available 
to Member State authorities for enforcement of the 
Seveso II Directive.  For this reason, the European 
Commission along with competent authorities 
responsible for Seveso II implementation have long 
held this area as a priority for EU level technical 
cooperation.  There is a strongly shared commitment 
to continuing to work together to increase the 
effectiveness of inspection practices and to ensure a 
consistent approach with respect to interpreting 
Seveso requirements through inspections across the 
European Union. 
The Seveso Inspections Series is intended to be a set 
of publications reflecting conclusions and key points 
from technical exchanges, research and analyses on 
topics relevant to the effective implementation of the 
inspection requirements of the Seveso II Directive.  
These publications are intended to facilitate the 
sharing of information about country experiences and 
practices for the purpose of fostering greater 
effectiveness, consistency and transparency in the 
implementation of Article 18 of the Directive.  The 
series is managed by the European Commission’s 
Technical Working Group on Seveso II Inspections 
(TWG 2), consisting of inspectors appointed by 
members of the Committee of the Competent 
Authorities for Implementation of the Seveso II 
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Directive to represent Seveso inspection programmes 
throughout the European Union.  The TWG is 
coordinated by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau 
(MAHB) of the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre with the support of DG Environment.  
This publication, “Emergency response planning” is 
one of a series of publications that form part of the 
Seveso Inspections Publication Series.  The 
publication series is one of a number of initiatives 
currently in place or in development to support 
implementation of the Directive and sponsored at EU 
level.  In particular, a prime source of content for 
publications in this series is the Mutual Joint Visit 
(MJV) Programme for Seveso Inspections.  Launched 
in 1999, the European Commission’s MJV Programme 
was intended to serve as a vehicle for promoting 
technical exchange among Member State Seveso II 
inspectors.  The aim of the programme was to 
encourage the sharing and adoption of best practices 
for inspections through a system of regular 
information exchange.  The visits would be hosted by 
different Seveso countries (hence visits would be 
“mutual”) and targeted for working inspectors of other 
Seveso countries (and thereby “joint” visits) charged 
with assessing compliance with the Seveso II 
Directive in industrial installations.  The MJV 
Programme is managed by MAHB in consultation with 
the TWG on Seveso II Inspections.  
Since 2005 the MJV programme has encouraged visits 
focusing on topics of specific interest for Seveso 
inspections as identified by the TWG. The conclusions 
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and observations of inspectors participating in these 
workshops are published as part of the Seveso 
Inspections Series. 
The mission of the TWG is to identify and recommend 
actions to promote exchange of information and 
collaborative research among the Seveso countries for 
improving the quality and consistency of 
implementation of Seveso II obligations within the 
Seveso inspection authorities.  The results of these 
efforts may also be published separately on the 
Seveso Inspections website, or combined with MJV 
summaries in the Seveso Inspections Series.  
For more information on Seveso inspections, please 
visit http://sevesoinspections.jrc.it. This site and the 
MAHB website (http://mahbsrv.jrc.ec.europa.eu) 
contain useful references to Seveso legislation, its 
implementation and related risk management and 
assessment projects. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
It is long accepted that effective management of 
chemical accident risks requires a wholistic approach 
such that all possible prevention, mitigation and 
emergency response measures are taken into account 
to achieve risk reduction objectives.  The European 
Union’s Seveso Directive, established in 1982 for the 
control of major chemical hazards, expresses a firm 
commitment to this philosophy, strengthening and 
refining it successively in both Seveso II and now the 
current Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU).  In 
particular, Seveso II and III reflected this vision 
broadly through the general obligation to take “all 
necessary measures” and in giving central importance 
to implementation of an effective safety management 
system that promotes integration of business 
operations with prevention, mitigation and emergency 
planning measures, in full recognition of the functional 
interdependencies that ultimately drive safety 
performance.     
In chemical risk management, there is a hierarchical 
relationship between the three types of measures, 
such that prevention measures are considered the 
highest level of protection, followed by mitigation to 
reduce impacts, with emergency planning and 
response to reduce consequences in the event that 
prevention and mitigation fail to prevent a major 
incident. Since the probability of failure of both 
prevention and mitigation measures is considered 
2      Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 
 
greater than one, it is standard good practice to 
assign appropriate emergency response measures 
(internal and external) to every major accident 
scenario on a site.  The assignment of emergency 
response measures is the function of emergency 
planning.  As such, emergency planning is a specific 
obligation of the Directive embedded in Article 12.   
Despite its importance in Seveso implementation, 
emergency planning practices are only occasionally 
raised as a topic for EU level exchange among Seveso 
authorities.  There remain numerous opportunities for 
information exchange on emergency planning for 
chemical hazard sites at EU level in the context of EU 
co-ordination on civil protection and public health 
response to hazardous materials and environmental 
accidents. However, these exchanges often do not 
support exchanges that specifically address Seveso 
obligations, in particular, how certain provisions are 
interpreted, successes and challenges in practices 
used in enforcement and implementation, and tools 
and scientific references for determining technical 
inputs to emergency planning decisions.    
For this reason, it was considered that a workshop on 
Emergency Planning for Seveso authorities would 
offer an opportunity to start a dialogue on this topic at 
EU level.  To this end, the Irish Central Competent 
Authority (CCA) proposed to host a workshop on 
emergency planning to the European Commission and 
the EU Technical Working Group on Seveso 
Inspections in the framework of the Mutual Joint Visit 
(MJV) programme of workshops specifically targeting 
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the Seveso inspector community. Since 1999, the MJV 
programme of workshops has served as a vehicle for 
the promoting of technical exchange among Member 
State Seveso inspectors on relevant topics for 
implementation and enforcement of the Seveso 
Directive.     
Therefore, on 3-5 October 2012, the Health and 
Safety Authority (HSA), the CCA in Ireland for the 
Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 
(COMAH), hosted a Mutual Joint Visit (MJV) Phase 2 
workshop on Emergency Response Planning in Dublin, 
Ireland1.  The purpose of the MJV was to share good 
practice for emergency planning within Seveso 
countries and identify possible areas of future 
exchange or collaboration at EU level in future.   The 
dialogue fostered by the workshop could be 
                                                            
1 The HSA is the sole CCA for the Seveso Directive 98/82/EC in Ireland.  It is primarily 
an occupational health body.  Internally it is split into three divisions one of which 
has responsibilities in the chemical area – the Chemical and Prevention Division.  
The unit within the Division dealing with Seveso is COMAH, Chemical Production and 
Storage. The unit has a manager and seven inspectors based between Dublin and 
Cork.  The unit also deals with sub-COMAH sites and a number of specialised 
sectors. The inspectors of the unit assess safety reports and provide Land-Use 
Planning advice as well as carrying out the COMAH inspections.  They also prepare 
files where enforcement actions are initiated. Local Competent Authorities are 
responsible for emergency planning in Ireland.  These usually consist of the local fire 
authority, An Garda Síochána (National Police Service of Ireland) and the Health 
Service Executive (body with statutory responsibility for the management and 
delivery of health and personal social services in the Republic of Ireland). COMAH 
inspectors from the HSA also attend internal and external emergency plan  tests. 
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particularly beneficial for the EU enforcement 
community given the number and variety of 
competent authorities involved in some way with 
emergency response planning throughout the EU and 
widely differing national approaches.   
This publication presents the highlights of the 
exchanges during this workshop with the expectation 
that they will provide knowledge to improve 
emergency planning practices to competent 
authorities in all Seveso countries as well as the 
broader stakeholder community. 
1.3 Proceedings and outcomes 
Exchanges have a number of benefits including 
benchmarking of good practice, sharing of common 
concerns, and identification of emerging challenges 
that could be the topic of future dialogue 
collaboration.  In this workshop, the following topics 
were proposed as the basis of discussions: 
• Emergency planning in the safety management 
system:  How should the emergency planning 
processes be described and what are good 
practices for assessing these processes? 
• Testing of the External Emergency Plan (EEP):  
How should EEPs be tested?  What is the role 
of the competent authority in regard to EEP 
testing?   
• Establishing the public information zone: How 
should the public information zone be 
determined? What is best practice for providing 
Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 5 
 
 
information to the public and communicating 
during a major accident? 
• Determining the emergency planning threat 
zone:  How is the emergency planning threat 
zone determined? How is the critical accident 
scenario selected? 
In this document, outcomes are presented for each 
topic.  
How is the safety management system assessed 
in practice with regard to emergency planning 
and response? 
 Checklists: The SMS for emergency planning and 
response is generally assessed using checklists 
and by examining documentation including the 
emergency policy of the company.   
 Coordination: Inspections may be co-ordinated 
between competent authorities or they may be 
carried out by individual competent authorities.   
 On-site exercises:  A number of countries 
consider that it is also necessary to assess the 
emergency response exercise in order to have a 
complete picture.  In particular, on-site exercises 
are also used as a means of assessing the SMS. 
Emergency response exercises can be especially 
useful for observing deficiencies in the internal and 
external emergency plans. 
 SMS and emergency response testing: There 
was some variation between Seveso countries 
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about assessing the SMS as part of emergency 
response testing.  Some countries reported that 
on-site exercises are used while others reported 
that the SMS is not assessed as part of emergency 
response testing. 
 Role of Inspections. To complement the safety 
report review, an onsite inspection can be used to 
verify the emergency response plan, e.g., 
 that the operator has an emergency response 
department or section, 
 that there is an emergency response policy,  
 that emergency responders are present,  
 that a risk assessment has been documented, 
 that sprinklers and other control equipment 
function as intended. 
 Joint inspections: The use of joint inspections by 
competent authorities to assess the SMS varies 
between Seveso countries.  In some countries, the 
inspections are coordinated and in others, the 
individual competent authorities carry out their 
own inspections.  An example was given by one 
Member State where the environmental agency 
inspects the documentation and the fire brigade 
and civil protection agencies do the on-site 
inspection and check the emergency plan.   
 Assessment of the SMS.  The SMS assessment 
should verify that the safety management system 
(SMS) is not an isolated exercise, but grounded in 
reality.  A “reality check” could look for the 
following information:  
Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 7 
 
 
 Evidence of adequate staff and equipment 
resources 
 Documentation that critical control systems 
(instrumentation, equipment, structures, etc.) 
have been identified and are inspected and 
tested regularly 
 Consideration of risks to emergency response 
teams in scenario development, including: 
 timing of the emergency response effort for 
different scenarios 
 consideration of different decision pathways 
based on different scenario outcomes 
 pathways to escalation for each scenario 
identified.  
 Assessing scenarios.  Several countries agreed 
that selection of the most appropriate major 
accident hazard scenarios for the EEP is a 
significant challenge.  At least one country focuses 
the emergency planning assessment on the 
scenarios, by reviewing the scenarios (for 
completeness, quality), the comments made by 
fire rescue, and whether the emergency response 
plans are practical and effective. 
 Reviewing the safety report.  Some countries 
consider that it is adequate to assess emergency 
planning on the basis of the safety report alone. 
However, several countries disagreed with this 
point.  Many countries felt the information in the 
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safety report was not sufficient for judging the 
quality of emergency planning.  
What is the best way to test the EEP? 
 Live vs. desktop exercises. Live exercises are 
carried out in more detail and are deemed to be 
important for finding weaknesses in EEPs.  
However, desktop exercises seem to be carried 
out more frequently in Seveso countries because 
they are easier to organise when there are a large 
number of sites and less costly.  Desktop exercises 
are thought to be useful in understanding the roles 
of the competent authorities. For example, it can 
be beneficial to conduct a table top exercise 
initially so that logistical issues are resolved before 
running with a live exercise.  In fact, live and 
desktop exercises have important complementary 
functions and should each be incorporated into the 
testing routine.   
EEPs for domino establishments are tested at the 
same time in some countries. 
 Scenario selection for testing the EEP.  EEPs 
are generally tested using a standard or guidance, 
which tends to vary at national and local levels.  
They are generally based on major accident 
hazard scenarios identified in the safety report but 
not necessarily the worst case scenario.  The 
workshop groups highlighted the importance of 
selecting good scenarios in order for EEP tests to 
be successful.  
Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 9 
 
 
Mitigation measures proposed by the 
establishment are tested as part of the EEP in 
some countries and it is expected that the 
operator would brief the fire services on arrival.  
In others, it is an internal matter between the fire 
brigade and the operator when testing the IEP. 
 Reporting test results. Written reports are 
prepared in all Seveso countries after EEP tests.  
In some, the local competent authorities are 
responsible for producing the reports.  The 
operator may also be required to report on testing 
of the internal emergency plan.   
 Participation and observation by competent 
authorities.   The role of each competent 
authority is considered to be clear regarding the 
testing of EEPs.  In some Seveso countries the 
national authority has a reporting role only while 
in others, a national authority may be required to 
liaise with the operator on the interface between 
the IEP and the EEP and assist the local competent 
authorities, particularly if the operator is reluctant 
to provide information.  The local competent 
authorities are responsible for drawing up the EEP 
in most Seveso countries.    
 
In some Seveso countries, all relevant authorities 
attend EEP tests.  In others, the CCA may or may 
not attend EEP tests and may give advice. The 
importance of going on-site and making an 
assessment was emphasised by some participants. 
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 Internal vs. external emergency plan testing. 
IEPs are examined to determine the site hazards 
and associated risks, planned site responses and 
potential to interact with the external emergency 
responders. These are all vital contributors to the 
preparation of a good EEP.   
 
There was some variation between Seveso 
countries regarding testing of the IEP in 
conjunction with the EEP.  Some countries require 
or prefer testing of the IEP in conjunction with the 
EEP.  In others, it is written into the procedures 
and is carried out during live exercises but not 
during desktop exercises.  As a practical matter, 
resources and competence are not always 
available for both tests to be undertaken at the 
same time.   
 Pre- and post-brief testing.  Briefing before 
exercises and a thorough debriefing afterwards 
are essential components.  If major deficiencies 
are identified during an EEP test, it is not usually 
re-tested.  However, deficiencies are followed up 
and remedied.  EEPs should be live documents 
that are updated following tests. Debriefing after 
the exercise ensures that the weaker elements of 
the EEP are disposed of and the good elements 
are retained, with a record kept of the changes 
made and the reasons for them.  
 Cost of testing.  Testing emergency plans can be 
quite costly.  The recovery of costs for EEP tests 
varies between Seveso countries. Sometimes 
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costs are recovered indirectly through a special 
tax on Seveso sites.  In a few countries, the 
competent authorities charge the operator for use 
of their resources in testing exercises (either a 
specific percentage or a fixed cost).  However, in a 
number of countries the competent authorities 
absorb all the costs generated from their 
participation. In one country, the local competent 
authorities can make a reduction in the cost if they 
get a training benefit from the exercise.  A few 
countries charge for the running of EEP tests.   
How is the emergency planning threat zone 
determined? 
• Role of authorities vs. role of industry in 
selecting reference scenarios.  In general, the 
operator is responsible for defining major accident 
scenarios in the safety report.  However, countries 
vary as to whether the operator also selects the 
reference scenario(s) for external emergency 
response planning. A few countries even prefer 
that operators in the same local area consult 
together to select an appropriate scenario for 
external planning purposes.    
In some cases, scenarios for emergency planning 
may be identified as a distinct set of scenarios 
within the safety report or in a separate 
document.     
• Methodology for selecting reference 
scenarios.   Based on various criteria, the 
12      Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 
 
authority or operator will select the appropriate 
scenario(s) to define the threat zone(s).  There is 
variation among countries in the degree of liberty 
that the operator is allowed in selecting 
methodologies, endpoints (e.g., exposure levels) 
and other inputs.  Generally, regardless of how the 
selection process is defined, authorities must 
examine the outcome and review the associated 
calculations to ensure that they are consistent and 
reasonable, that the operator has used recognised 
methods, and can justify the method that has 
been chosen.   
The factors that determine the modelling 
methodology accepted by the authorities may also 
depend on whether risk or consequence-based 
approaches are preferred.  Some Seveso countries 
require that specific methods are applied to 
support authority obligations for land-use and 
emergency planning.   Indeed, some countries are 
very specific in requiring a certain approach 
(deterministic or risk-based) to select threat zone 
scenarios for emergency planning.  There are also 
countries that prefer a consequence-based 
approach for selecting threat zone scenarios, while 
accepting or even encouraging a risk-based 
approach for safety report (i.e., SMS) scenarios.  
• The worst case scenario.  Some countries have 
adopted an approach that specifically uses the 
“worst case scenario” (or “credible worst case 
scenario”) to drive emergency planning.  The 
definition of worst case scenarios may sometimes 
Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 13 
 
 
differ from the definition of the scenarios selected 
by the site as a basis for the safety management 
strategy in the safety report.  For example, the 
emergency planning process may not allow 
application of technical measures for controlling or 
mitigating accident consequences of the reference 
scenario, these same measures may be assumed 
for purposes of site risk management. Guidance 
for determining the worst case scenario appears to 
be available in some Seveso countries.  
• Acceptance of mitigation measures.  In some 
Seveso countries, implementation of technical 
measures for mitigation and control are 
considered as part of the IEP only, while they will 
by default be taken into account in countries when 
risk based calculations drive scenario selection. 
For consequence-based approaches, whether 
mitigation and control measures are accepted in 
the scenario depends on expert judgement 
concerning the reliability of the measure in an 
emergency situation.  Some countries stated that 
it can be difficult to assess the reliability of on-site 
mitigation measures outside a risk context.  Some 
authorities take the approach that technical 
mitigation measures (e.g., passive measures) are 
acceptable, but not active measures.  
• Domino effects. Reference scenarios involving 
domino effects from multiple sites are also 
considered in some countries. 
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How should the Public Information Zone be 
determined? 
• Methods for identifying who should receive 
information (“the public information zone” or 
PIZ).  Countries vary considerably in the 
approach to identifying the geographical area 
defining the population, the “public information 
zone”, that should be informed about the presence 
of a chemical accident risk (“persons likely to be 
affected” in Article 14).  Selecting the PIZ may be 
the responsibility of the national authority, local 
authority or operator depending on the Member 
State. Consequence-based approaches (rather 
than risk-based) are most commonly used for 
determining the PIZ 
In some Seveso countries, determination of the 
PIZ is related to the EEP and is based on the 
maximum consequence scenario zone.  Some 
countries, such as Ireland and the UK, have 
established a specific methodology to define the 
PIZ. In other countries, the public information 
area is based on information provided by the 
operator and it is determined in consultation with 
the local authority.   Methodologies used for 
external emergency planning, such as Aloha and 
Effects, may equally be applied to determine PIZ’s 
but the results may be applied differently for PIZ’s 
than for threat zones.   
Participants agreed that it would be useful to have 
common general principles or “benchmarks” for 
establishing PIZs, that could then be further 
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interpreted by Seveso authorities to meet local 
needs. 
• Determining “persons likely to be affected”.  
There was a discussion about “persons likely to be 
affected” in terms of Article 14 vs. Article 16 
(Information to be supplied by the operator and 
actions to be taken following a major accident”).  
For preparedness purposes, “persons likely to be 
affected” are defined broadly on the basis of an 
equally possible range of consequences for a given 
reference scenario. The geographic distribution 
and affected population may be much wider than if 
that accident actually were to occur, because a 
wide range of possible impacts must be taken into 
consideration to cover all possible sequences of 
events.  For post-emergency communication the 
term “likely” is not relevant with respect to the 
scenario because the accident has already 
happened and to a large extent, the geographic 
scope and severity of consequences is known.  
Rather, “likely” applies to those who are in fact 
known to be affected already.  
• Defining the term “affected”.  Another related 
question was raised concerning the term 
“affected”.  It was suggested that definition of this 
term is subject to broad interpretation.  For 
example, in Ireland, Zone 3 of the public 
information zone is purposely defined so that it 
could possibly include those that may not be very 
much affected in human health terms, but could 
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experience other impacts, such as disruption of 
local services (e.g., electrical, telephone, roads, 
etc.) or populations that are simply close enough 
distance to the impact zone to be apprehensive 
about their own situation. 
 Costs.  In some Seveso countries, the costs 
associated with determining the PIZ are included 
in the costs associated with assessing the safety 
report.  Some pass the costs onto operators while 
others do not.       
What is best practice for provision of 
information to the public? 
 Pre-incident information to the public. Most 
Seveso countries reported that information to the 
public should be disseminated both electronically 
and by leaflet.  It was suggested that websites 
with risk information on maps and data contained 
as part of the permit process operated by some 
countries could be used.  Citizens themselves can 
check what Seveso sites are present in their local 
area and sometimes also whether they are within 
a threat zone.  Coupled with proactive outreach, 
online communication can be advantageous 
because it can be updated regularly at  low cost 
and has potential to host a wide range of 
information.   
 Responsibility for public information.  
Approval and communication of information to be 
communicated is managed differently in Seveso 
countries, also depending on whether it is pre-
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incident information or after a major accident has 
occurred.  The national authority takes a leading 
role in some countries defining the strategy and 
determining the content, particularly for pre-
incident information, but in some countries this 
responsibility is allocated to local authorities 
(which could be the municipality, the fire brigade, 
a public health office, for example) with the 
national authority in a consultative and/or 
approval role. A number of countries reported that 
it is the responsibility of the emergency 
responders, not the CCA to communicate with the 
public during a major accident.  It appeared that 
the size of the country and the historic role of the 
national government in emergency planning may 
play a significant role in this decision. 
 Crisis communication.  A number of suggestions 
were made about the means that could be used to 
inform the public during a major accident including 
public and company alarms, TV, radio, telephone, 
Short Message Service (text) and social media. 
Online sites for communicating to the public are 
also increasingly used to communicate risk and 
preparedness information.   
 Use of sirens.  There was much discussion during 
the plenary session about the means used to 
inform the public other than a siren.  In response 
to a question about the best way to inform the 
public, it was suggested that meetings with local 
community groups and regular talks could be 
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used.  In order to ensure that everyone received 
the information, the use of widespread advertising 
campaigns and information displayed in many 
locations was suggested.   
 Use of social media.  The use of social media 
(e.g., Twitter) for communicating during 
emergencies has become a global phenomenon.  
Thus far the use of social media as part of a 
communication strategy during a Seveso 
emergency does not appear to be widespread 
among Seveso countries.  During such 
emergencies, the affected people are sometimes 
told to avoid using their phones and in some cases 
the authorities may have to prevent public access 
to the mobile network.  Still, some authorities 
have tried it, with positive results in some cases, 
and less positive results in others.  Therefore, at 
the time of the workshop, it appeared that use of 
social media for public communication in Seveso 
emergencies was an isolated, rather than 
standard, practice, especially since it did not 
appear that any national authorities represented 
at the workshop had adopted or tested its use for 
this purpose. It could be that this situation 
changes over time.  
 
Conclusions 
The results of the workshop made evident the 
significant benefits of exchanging good practice on 
emergency response planning between Seveso 
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authorities.  This particular exchange included a 
discussion on a number of basic topics, how is 
emergency planning in the SMS and safety report 
assessed, how is testing conducted and what role do 
authorities play in it, and what means of 
communication are used to communicate to the public 
exposed to chemical risk as well as when an accident 
occurs.  The workshop also touched on important and 
challenging technical topics associated with 
emergency planning, including the practical aspects of 
response that must be considered (e.g., timing, 
resources), how and what to test in test exercises, 
preparing responders for crisis communication and 
decision-making, defining reference accident 
scenarios for emergency response plans, and 
determining the geographic area for disseminating 
pre-incident information.  These topics could be easily 
explored further and in greater depth at a future 
workshop or other similar venue.  Emergency 
planning for Seveso sites may also be an interesting 
topic for further research, including as a special topic 
for analysis of lessons learned from past accidents.  In 
addition, it could be also envisioned that these types 
of exchanges may benefit from including EU civil 
protection authorities and public health authorities 
with related responsibilities at EU level.  As EU level 
co-ordination and technical support for Member States 
continues to evolve in the context of Seveso, and EU 
disaster risk management policy, there may be 
further opportunities for many of these ideas to be 
explored and elaborated.  
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1. EMERGENCY PLANNING IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE SEVESO DIRECTIVE  
It is long accepted that effective management of 
chemical accident risks requires a wholistic approach 
such that all possible prevention, mitigation and 
emergency response measures are taken into account 
to achieve risk reduction objectives.  In particular, 
Seveso II and III reflected this vision broadly through 
the general obligation to take “all necessary 
measures” and in giving central importance to 
implementation of an effective safety management 
system that promotes integration of business 
operations with prevention, mitigation and emergency 
planning measures, in full recognition of the functional 
interdependencies that ultimately drive safety 
performance.     
In chemical risk management, there is a hierarchical 
relationship between the three types of measures, 
such that prevention measures are considered the 
highest level of protection, followed by mitigation to 
reduce impacts, with emergency planning and 
response to reduce consequences in the event that 
prevention and mitigation fail to prevent a major 
incident. Since the probability of failure of both 
prevention and mitigation measures is considered 
greater than one, it is standard good practice to 
assign appropriate emergency response measures 
(internal and external) to every major accident 
scenario on a site.  The assignment of emergency 
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response measures is the function of emergency 
planning.  As such, emergency planning is a specific 
obligation of the Directive embedded in Article 12. 
The Seveso Directive requires operators of upper-tier 
establishments where dangerous substances are 
present in significant quantities, to prepare an internal 
emergency plan (IEP) for the measures to be taken 
inside an establishment in the event of a major 
accident.  They are also required to provide the 
necessary information to competent authorities to 
enable them to prepare an external emergency plan 
(EEP).      
The Directive states that emergency plans must be 
established with the objectives of: 
 containing and controlling incidents so as to 
minimize the effects, and to limit damage to 
man, the environment and property, 
 implementing the measures necessary to 
protect man and the environment from the 
effects of major accidents, 
 communicating the necessary information to 
the public and to the services or authorities 
concerned in the area, 
 providing for the restoration and clean-up of 
the environment following a major accident. 
The emergency plans are required to contain the 
information set out in Annex IV of the Directive, 
specifying the minimum data and information to be 
provided in both internal and external emergency 
plans.   
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In addition, emergency planning is identified as one of 
the 7 key elements of the site safety management 
system as described in Annex III of the Seveso 
Directive. 
“Planning for emergencies — adoption 
and implementation of procedures to 
identify foreseeable emergencies by 
systematic analysis, to prepare, test 
and review emergency plans to 
respond to such emergencies and to 
provide specific training for the staff 
concerned. Such training shall be 
given to all personnel working in the 
establishment, including relevant 
subcontracted personnel”  
 
1.1. Challenges in enforcing and 
implementing effective emergency 
planning within Seveso countries 
The Seveso Directive requires that external 
emergency plans prepared by the authorities should 
take account of risks associated with upper tier 
establishment.  Most countries do not require that 
external emergency plans account also for hazards 
present at lower-tier establishments.  Rather, they 
are usually assumed into the general intervention 
plans prepared for a locality by the local fire brigade.   
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In practice a formal internal emergency plan is also 
required for every establishment in every country.  
Usually, there is specific legislation (mostly fire 
protection legislation) that imposes this standard and 
covers a wide range of establishments that is much 
broader than Seveso establishments. 
The emergency plan is usually based on scenarios.  
These scenarios should consider all environmental, 
health and safety issues.  Some scenarios require 
specific intervention material and equipment, e.g., 
foam, floating barrages.   
In general, it is considered that the emergency plan 
should include (but not be limited to): 
 a description of all reference scenarios 
 the intervention strategy for each scenario 
 links to relevant codes and good practices 
 site plans identifying key locations and areas 
where hazardous materials are present 
 an inventory of intervention equipment and 
manpower available 
 other information of importance to emergency 
services 
The emergency plan must take into account normal 
and abnormal conditions, different working conditions 
(night, weekend), and other routine variations in the 
plant schedule that might require additional or 
different emergency planning measures.   
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For additional assurance, inspectors should discuss 
emergency plans with fire brigades.  The fire brigades 
often can confirm whether the site is appropriately 
prepared to implement the measures foreseen in the 
emergency plan.  For example, they can provide 
information on the equipment, materials, knowledge, 
experience, and manpower available to the site for 
immediate use in case of an accident.   
Each Member State has developed its own 
implementation approach to this obligation.  The roles 
of competent authorities may vary considerably in 
Seveso countries, in particular, depending on the size 
of the Member State, the role of fire services assigned 
in national legislation associated with the Seveso 
Directive, and the degree to which Seveso 
enforcement is centralised or de-centralised. Different 
competent authorities may play different roles within 
the same Member State. Typical responsibilities 
assigned to one or more competent authorities under 
this obligation may include, but not be limited to, the 
following:  
 Notifying other relevant competent authorities of 
the existence of an upper-tier site and providing 
the associated safety report  
 Reviewing the safety report of upper-tier sites to 
check scenarios for onsite emergency planning 
measures 
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 Reviewing the safety report to  assess how 
emergency planning  is implemented within the 
safety management system 
 Inspecting the site to verify the internal 
emergency plan and onsite emergency response 
measures 
 Facilitating information exchange between the 
operator and other relevant competent authorities 
for external emergency planning purposes 
 Leading the development of external emergency 
plans 
 Advising on or reviewing external emergency 
plans 
 Attending exercises to test the external 
emergency plan and making observations on those 
tests 
 Ensuring that the public concerned is given early 
opportunity to give its opinion on external 
emergency plans when they are being established 
or substantially modified 
The diversity of responsibilities combined with the 
diversity of Member State institutional historical, and 
social differences represents both a significant 
advantage and disadvantage for promoting an EU 
wide vision of emergency planning for major hazard 
sites.  On the one hand, the diversity fosters 
creativity, and to some extent, each Member State is 
a testing ground for other Seveso countries for a 
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particular approach to implementation and 
enforcement. The most effective approaches 
eventually can be shared with other countries for the 
benefit of risk management EU-wide. On the other 
hand, diversity in approaches can also lead to 
inconsistency in the assessment and implementation 
of emergency planning across the EU, in turn leading 
to perceptions of unfairness and even varying levels 
of safety performance.   
Given these considerations, emergency planning is a 
fruitful area for exchange of information between 
Seveso competent authorities across Europe.  
Exchanges have a number of benefits including 
benchmarking of good practice, sharing of common 
concerns, and identification of emerging challenges 
that could be the topic of future dialogue 
collaboration.  In particular, there are specific 
elements of emergency planning that could benefit in 
this regard, notably: 
 Emergency planning in the safety management 
system:  How should emergency planning be 
described and what are good techniques for 
assessing them? 
 Testing of the External Emergency Plan (EEP):  
How should EEPs be tested?  What is the role 
of the competent authority in regard to EEP 
testing?   
 Establishing the public information zone: How 
should the public information zone be 
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determined? What is best practice for providing 
information to the public and communicating 
during a major accident? 
 Determining the emergency planning threat 
zone:  How is the emergency planning threat 
zone determined? How is the critical accident 
scenario selected?  
An effective approach to emergency planning depends 
on both the actors and the information available to 
support these critical aspects.  Indeed, emergency 
planning is somewhat unique compared to prevention 
and mitigation in that it does not belong solely to the 
site operator.  It represents the operational interface 
in which the operator and the local authorities share 
responsibility for controlling accident impacts.  
Therefore, the interaction between these actors, the 
sharing of relevant inputs with appropriate detail, 
competency on each side, and the degree to which 
there is a shared philosophy towards managing 
chemical accident emergencies, are all factors that 
can help or hinder a good planning process. 
Moreover, emergency planning has the same complex 
technical requirements as prevention and mitigation 
and land-use planning.  The site risk assessment 
process also drives the decision-making within this 
important function.  As such, operators and 
competent authorities face the same challenges in 
emergency planning as with these related disciplines 
in terms of the establishment of criteria for decision-
making, obtaining correct and complete data for the 
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decision process, and dealing with the inherent 
uncertainties of risk assessment in general. 
For this reason, the Irish authorities proposed an EU 
level workshop for sharing and comparison of Member 
State experience and practices in emergency 
planning, with the view that exchange could be highly 
beneficial to all Seveso countries to identify and 
improvements to their emergency planning processes. 
 
1.2. The Mutual Joint Visit 
Workshop on emergency planning 
On 3-5 October 2012, the Health and Safety Authority 
(HSA), the Central Competent Authority (CCA) in 
Ireland for the Control of Major Accident Hazard 
Regulations (COMAH), hosted a Mutual Joint Visit 
(MJV) Phase 2 workshop on Emergency Response 
Planning in Dublin, Ireland2.  The MJV programme is 
                                                            
2 The HSA is the sole CCA for the Seveso Directive 98/82/EC in Ireland.  It is primarily 
an occupational health body.  Internally it is split into three divisions one of which 
has responsibilities in the chemical area – the Chemical and Prevention Division.  
The unit within the Division dealing with Seveso is COMAH, Chemical Production and 
Storage. The unit has a manager and seven inspectors , based between Dublin and 
Cork.  The unit also deals with sub-COMAH sites and a number of specialised 
sectors. The inspectors of the unit assess Safety Reports and provide Land-Use 
Planning advice as well as carrying out the COMAH inspections.  They also prepare 
files where enforcement actions are initiated. Local Competent Authorities are 
responsible for emergency planning in Ireland.  These usually consist of the local fire 
authority, An Garda Síochána (National Police Service of Ireland) and the Health 
Service Executive (body with statutory responsibility for the management and 
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shown in Annex 1. The purpose of the MJV was to 
share good practice for emergency planning within the 
Seveso countries and identify possible areas of future 
exchange or collaboration at EU level in future.   The 
dialogue fostered by the workshop could be 
particularly beneficial for the EU enforcement 
community given the number and variety of 
competent authorities involved in some way with 
emergency response planning throughout the EU and 
widely differing national approaches.   
Since 1999, the Mutual Joint programme of 
workshops for Seveso inspections has served as a 
vehicle for the promoting of technical exchange 
among Member State Seveso inspectors on relevant 
topics for implementation and enforcement of the 
Seveso Directive.  The programme is sponsored by 
the European Commission on behalf of the Committee 
of the Competent Authorities for Implementation of 
the Seveso II Directive and DG-Environment, and is 
managed by the Major Accident Hazard Bureau 
(MAHB) of the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre with oversight of TWG 2.  The programme 
offers Seveso countries the opportunity to develop 
together a more sophisticated understanding of what 
constitutes Seveso compliance and acceptable safety 
in an inspection context.  Moreover, it is rooted in the 
belief that countries can learn from each other and by 
doing so increase their technical proficiency and the 
                                                                                                                 
delivery of health and personal social services in the Republic of Ireland). COMAH 
inspectors from the HSA also attend internal and external emergency plan  tests. 
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effectiveness of their respective inspection 
programmes. 
The HSA took the lead in planning the programme of 
the MJV workshop with advice from the EC-JRC-
MAHB.  The programme structure took on board the 
established MJV protocols and incorporated (as 
appropriate) suggestions for achieving good outcomes 
from MJV workshops based on past workshop 
experiences shared by the EC-JRC-MAHB and the 
TWG 2, including past MJV host countries.   
In addition to representatives from the Irish 
authorities and EC-JRC-MAHB, there were 27 
participants from 21 countries (18 Member States, 2 
countries in the European Economic Area (EEA), and 1 
Candidate Country), and a representative from 
industry3.  (For a list of participants, see Annex 2.) 
The MJV ran over three days and was divided into four 
separate sessions (called “workshops” in the 
programme.  The themes of the sessions were as 
follows:   
                                                            
3 Under the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), EEA countries must 
implement EU environmental legislation, including the Seveso Directive (except 
Liechtenstein, since it has not had Seveso sites in the past).  Candidate Countries are 
also obliged to work towards Seveso Directive adoption and implementation.  Since 
both EEA and Candidate Countries participate 
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Session 1: Safety Management System, Emergency 
Planning and Response 
Session 2: Testing of Emergency Plans and the Role 
of the Competent Authorities 
Session 3: The Public Information Area and 
Communicating with the Public 
Session 4: The Worst Case Accident and Threat Zone 
for Emergency Planning 
A similar format was employed for each session, with 
approximately one-third of each session devoted to 
introductory presentations, one-third to small group 
discussion, and one-third to a plenary discussion as 
follow-up to the small group discussions.  The 
introductory presentations served to set the scene 
and highlight questions to be considered in the 
subsequent discussion. For the break-out discussions, 
participants were divided into three subgroups and 
asked to discuss and document their reactions to a 
structured set of questions on the topic.  Then the 
follow-up plenary session focused on sharing and 
discussing the highlights from the small group 
exchanges amongst all participants.   
The programme for each session is outlined in Annex 
3 and shows the titles of the presentations and the 
main workshop questions including the additional 
bullet point questions.   
This publication presents the highlights of the 
exchanges during this workshop with the expectation 
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that they will provide knowledge to improve 
emergency planning practices to competent 
authorities in all Seveso countries as well as the 
broader stakeholder community. 
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2. ASSESSING EMERGENCY PLANNING AND 
RESPONSE WITHIN THE SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
This section of the report describes the main 
conclusions and observations from the workshop in 
regard to defining and assessing emergency planning 
in the context of the safety management system 
(SMS). This session focused in particular on 
identifying best practice for assessing the safety 
management system regarding emergency planning 
and response.  It also highlighted the risks to site and 
civil emergency response teams (ERTs) and the need 
to assess this both in the safety report and in 
emergency response plans. There is substantial 
evidence in recent incident history documenting 
emergency planning failures, especially in 
consideration of numerous fire-fighter fatalities 
caused by chemical accidents all over the world.  The 
investigation report of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board 
(CSB) from the Albert City, Iowa turkey farm BLEVE 
(Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) is one 
important case study in this regard4. 
                                                            
4http://www.csb.gov/herrig-brothers-farm-propane-tank-
explosion/  
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In many cases, significant accident impacts can be 
traced directly to poor emergency response plans 
prepared by local authorities and operators.  Often 
ERTs are put at unnecessary risk. There is also some 
evidence that small to medium sites may present the 
greatest risk to ERTs.    
It was indicated by some participants that assessment 
needs to be made more challenging for operators. In 
general, most Seveso countries assess the SMS for 
emergency planning and response using checklists 
and by examining documentation including the 
emergency policy of the company. The approaches, 
including checklists, are not always well-coordinated 
between the various authorities, especially in 
countries where inspection is decentralized 
(performed by local inspectorates). In some countries, 
Workshops 1 and 2aimed to find answers to the following 
specific questions in regard to safety management 
systems: 
1. How is the safety management system assessed in 
practice with regard to emergency planning and 
response? 
2. What information should be included on the safety 
management system in the Major Accident Prevention 
Policy document and safety report? 
3. Are the roles of each competent authority clear with 
regard to testing External Emergency Plans (EEPs)? 
4. What is the best way to test EEPs? 
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one authority may be legally required to distribute the 
operator’s documentation to other authorities.     
The Seveso Directive states that internal and external 
emergency plans must be not only reviewed but also 
tested, and where necessary revised and updated by 
the operators and competent authorities at suitable 
intervals of no longer than three years.  In regard to 
the testing of external emergency plans, the role of 
the competent authority is fairly clear. A local 
competent authority is usually responsible for drawing 
up the external emergency plan in most countries.   
In some countries, the national competent authority 
has a reporting role only, such that its oversight is 
limited to the assessment of emergency planning and 
control measures in the safety report.  In others, the 
national authority may be required to liaise with the 
operator on the interface between the internal and 
external emergency plans and assist the local 
authorities, particularly if the operator is unwilling to 
provide much support.    
Good communication and exercises involving both 
internal and external responders are important to 
maximize cooperation in the case of a real 
emergency.  There can often be cultural differences 
that, if not overcome, may present a serious obstacle 
to effective response management. For example, it is  
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FIGURE 1: EXCERPT FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS FROM IRELAND’S NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE (2010 VERSION) 
often the case the emergency response team 
(internal) is more aware of the hazards and risks of a 
scenario than the civil response team, with the 
general public and the press being least aware.  This 
situation is somewhat inevitable considering that the 
on-site team has an inside track on what exists on 
site and the operational environment.  The planning 
and testing process can help build awareness about 
specific risks across the teams and reduce other 
potential conflicts in approaches that could be 
detrimental to emergency response efforts. 
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2.1. Practices for assessing 
emergency planning within the 
SMS 
 
From the discussions, approaches to the assessment 
of emergency planning within the SMS can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Checklists: The SMS for emergency planning and 
response is generally assessed using checklists 
and by examining documentation including the 
emergency policy of the company.   
 Coordination: Inspections may be co-ordinated 
between competent authorities or they may be 
carried out by individual competent authorities.   
 On-site exercises:  A number of countries 
consider that it is also necessary to assess the 
emergency response exercise also as a means of 
assessing the SMS. Emergency response exercises 
can be especially useful for observing deficiencies 
in the internal and external emergency plans. 
However, some Seveso countries reported that the 
SMS is not assessed as part of emergency 
response testing. 
 Role of inspections. To complement the safety 
report review, an onsite inspection can be used to 
verify the emergency response plan, e.g., 
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 that the operator has an emergency response 
department or section, 
 that there is an emergency response policy,  
 that emergency responders are present,  
 that a risk assessment has been documented, 
 that sprinklers and other control equipment 
function as intended. 
 Joint inspections: The use of joint inspections by 
competent authorities to assess the SMS varies 
between Seveso countries.  In some countries, the 
inspections are coordinated and in others, the 
individual competent authorities carry out their 
own inspections.  An example was given by one 
Member State where the environmental agency 
inspects the documentation and the fire brigade 
and civil protection agencies do the on-site 
inspection and check the emergency plan.   
 Assessment of the SMS.  The SMS assessment 
should verify that the safety management system 
(SMS) is not an isolated exercise, but grounded in 
reality.  A “reality check” could look for the 
following information:  
 Evidence of adequate staff and equipment 
resources 
 Documentation that critical control systems 
(instrumentation, equipment, structures, etc.) 
have been identified and are inspected and 
tested regularly 
 Consideration of risks to emergency response 
teams in scenario development, including: 
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 timing of the emergency response effort for 
different scenarios 
 consideration of different decision pathways 
based on different scenario outcomes 
 pathways to escalation for each scenario 
identified.  
 Assessing scenarios.  Several countries agreed 
that selection of the most appropriate major 
accident hazard scenarios for the EEP is a 
significant challenge.  At least one country focuses 
the emergency planning assessment on the 
scenarios, by reviewing the scenarios (for 
completeness, quality), the comments made by 
fire rescue, and whether the emergency response 
plans are practical and effective. 
 Reviewing the safety report.  Some countries 
consider that it is adequate to assess emergency 
planning on the basis of the safety report alone. 
However, several countries disagreed with this 
point.  Many countries felt the information in the 
safety report was not sufficient for judging the 
quality of emergency planning.  
 Examples of country specific practices: 
 Belgium. The SMS is assessed by the way in 
which the emergency exercise is performed.  
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Case Study on Planning for Emergencies:  
Handling 90% of gross domestic product exports, the Dublin 
port area is of immense strategic importance to the national 
economy. It hosts twelve Seveso establishments in total, most 
of which are involved in petroleum bulk storage.   
It had been the practice for many years that the petroleum 
storage operators relied on a common infrastructure 
provided by the Port Authority to mitigate major fire 
accidents since they did not individually have sufficient 
resources for this purpose.  The Irish CCA (HSA) had 
encouraged the Port Authority to upgrade the common facility 
for emergency response and an independent report made 
detailed recommendations in this regard in 2006.   
When the project stalled in 2008, the CCA engaged with the 
Port Authority (who was not an operator under Seveso) and 
obtained commitments to proceed.  However the operators 
were holding up progress because of the costs involved. 
In order to motivate the operators to take action, the CCA then 
developed a specific policy around each technical concern, 
specifying what “all necessary measures” were involved for 
these establishment types, the level of preparedness and 
response that would be required, and how the SMS was to 
address these issues.  The CCA conducted considerable 
background research in order to establish a baseline standard 
against which operators could compare the adequacy of their 
management systems in this regard.  In the end, the IP Model 
Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry, Part 19 (IP 
19) 
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Dublin Port 
was chosen as the main reference good practice document for 
the standard.  All the operators were inspected and their safety 
documentation was examined (including safety reports). 
Operators were requested to provide evidence that they were 
in fact taking all necessary measures and had in place adequate 
emergency response arrangements. 
Where this was not adequately demonstrated (which was in all 
cases!) enforcement notices were issued requiring the 
operators to: 
1. Determine the consequence distance to thermal 
radiation levels of 6.3, 8 and 32 kW/m2 for tank or 
bund fires of flammable liquid 
2. The resources required to prevent/mitigate those fires 
(with reference to IP 19) 
3. The resources actually available 
4. Submit an implementation plan to remedy any 
shortfall. 
A significant level of engagement then occurred between the 
CCA and the operators (and their technical consultants). By 
2011, all the operators had agreed on-site measures to improve 
their-on-site facilities and to contribute to the cost of the off-
site common infrastructure upgrade, so as to deliver adequate 
prevention and mitigation measures.  The project was due to be 
completed by the end of 2013. 
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The Safety Report is not considered to be 
adequate on its own for assessing the SMS.  It 
was reported that assessment needs to be 
made more challenging for operators.    
The fire brigade is concerned with the permit 
and assessing the safety report.  They go to 
the site on their own and there is no joint 
inspection with other authorities.   
 Cyprus.  A single authority attends the EEP 
exercise and gives an opinion. 
 Czech Republic. Different authorities have their 
own questions which are not coordinated. 
 Denmark. The environment, fire and police 
authorities meet before inspections.  Two 
inspections are carried out each year. 
 Finland.  The SMS is assessed by looking at the 
scenarios, the comments made by fire rescue 
and how good the plans are in practice.     
Only the national competent authority carries 
out inspections. 
The fire brigade is responsible for the EEP.  
The police and other authorities are under 
control of the fire brigade.      
 France. The safety report is used as the basis 
for assessing the SMS, including the EEP.  In 
contrast to Belgium, the safety report is              
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considered to contain sufficient information.  
Exercises are carried out by the fire brigade 
and used to observe deficiencies in the IEP and 
EEP.  High consequence and even catastrophic 
scenarios are routinely tested during 
inspections. 
 Germany. it takes three-four days to prepare 
for inspections.  This includes the preparation 
of specific checklists for the establishment. 
 Ireland. The SMS for emergency planning and 
response is assessed by inspectors from the 
central competent authority using a proforma.  
Exercises are carried out in a similar manner to 
France.   
Only the national competent authority carries 
out inspections. 
 The Netherlands. The SMS is assessed using 
checklists.  However, detailed assessment of 
the paperwork on its own is not considered to 
be sufficient. The inspection verifies that the 
operator has an emergency response 
department, and that there is a policy, risk 
responders and a risk assessment.   
 Norway. Only one or two parts of the SMS are 
checked at any one time.  Common checklists 
may be used by all the authorities.  The central 
authority does the inspection and does not 
always include the fire brigade. 
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Local authorities are responsible for emergency 
testing. 
 Poland.  The law does not allow joint 
inspections however pilot inspections may be 
carried out if operators volunteer for this.  The 
responsible authorities are those for the 
environment and for fire protection.  The 
operator’s documentation is checked by fire 
protection and its implementation in practice is 
verified at annual inspections.  An 
administrative decision is given at the end of 
the inspection and other relevant authorities 
may also give opinions.   
 Portugal.  The SMS is assessed by reviewing 
documentation.   
 Romania. A question list is used by a team for 
the first three days of the inspection.  There 
are no joint inspections.  The fire and civil 
brigades get involved after the inspection.  The 
fire brigades perform the tests of the 
emergency response plans.  Documentation is 
inspected by the environmental authority.   
 Switzerland. Each canton has a different 
system.  Usually, the inspector performs an 
assessment on his/her own but is part of a 
bigger team that provides input to the final 
opinion.  
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The Right Hand Side of the Bow-Tie in 
Europe - A Dutch Benchmarking Study 
At the time of the workshop, a European benchmark study 
was currently underway in the Netherlands conducted by the 
national centre of expertise on Seveso for the fire brigades in 
the Rotterdam region of the Netherlands. This particular 
region has 40% of Dutch heavy industry with more than 100 
Seveso II companies and nine industrial fire stations.  
Activities in the port include the storage and transport of 
explosives. 
The benchmark study examined the best practice for Seveso 
inspections concerning the right-hand side of the Bow-Tie, i. 
e., the response and mitigation events following a loss of 
containment of a dangerous substance. In particular, the study 
explored how the Seveso Directive addresses fire prevention 
and fire suppression and where the fire brigade fits within the 
inspection process. Through the process, project sponsors 
also aimed to promote knowledge sharing among the Member 
States, particularly concerning best practice, use of 
questionnaires or other tools. 
Of 9 Member States that had responded, 4 (45%) involved the 
fire brigade in Seveso inspection.  In 5 Member States (55%) 
the fire brigade were involved in some way in developing or 
reviewing the external emergency plan (EEP).  For 6 (66%) of 
the Member States surveyed, the legislation addresses the 
role of company fire brigades. 
The full results can be found at www.veiligheidsregio-rr.nl. 
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2.2. Practices for testing EEPs and 
clarification of the roles of the 
competent authorities 
 Live vs. desktop exercises. Live exercises are 
carried out in more detail and are deemed to be 
important for finding weaknesses in EEPs.  
However, desktop exercises seem to be carried 
out more frequently in Seveso countries because 
they are easier to organise when there are a large 
number of sites and less costly.  Desktop exercises 
are thought to be useful in understanding the roles 
of the competent authorities. For example, it can 
be beneficial to conduct a table top exercise 
initially so that logistical issues are resolved before 
running with a live exercise.  In fact, live and 
desktop exercises have important complementary 
functions and should each be incorporated into the 
testing routine.   
EEPs for domino establishments are tested at the 
same time in some countries. 
 Scenarios selection for testing the EEP.  EEPs 
are generally tested using a standard or guidance, 
which tends to vary at national and local levels.  
They are generally based on major accident 
hazard scenarios identified in the Safety Report 
but not necessarily the worst case scenario.  The 
workshop groups highlighted the importance of 
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selecting good scenarios in order for EEP tests to 
be successful.  
Mitigation measures proposed by the 
establishment are tested as part of the EEP in 
some countries and it is expected that the 
operator would brief the fire services on arrival.  
In others, it is an internal matter between the fire 
brigade and the operator when testing the IEP. 
 Reporting test results. Written reports are 
prepared in all Seveso countries after EEP tests.  
In some, the local competent authorities are 
responsible for producing the reports.  The 
operator may also be required to report on testing 
of the internal emergency plan.   
 Participation and observation by competent 
authorities.   The role of each competent 
authority is considered to be clear regarding the 
FIGURE 2:  THE EXERCISE CYCLE 
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testing of EEPs.  In some Seveso countries the 
national authority has a reporting role only while 
in others, a national authority may be required to 
liaise with the operator on the interface between 
the IEP and the EEP and assist the local competent 
authorities, particularly if the operator is reluctant 
to provide information.  The local competent 
authorities are responsible for drawing up the EEP 
in most Seveso countries.    
 
In some Seveso countries, all relevant authorities 
attend EEP tests.  In others, the CCA may or may 
not attend EEP tests and may give advice. The 
importance of going on-site and making an 
assessment was emphasised by some participants. 
 Internal vs. external emergency plan testing. 
IEPs are examined to determine the site hazards 
and associated risks, planned site responses and 
potential to interact with the external emergency 
responders. These are all vital contributors to the 
preparation of a good EEP.   
 
There was some variation between Seveso 
countries regarding testing of the IEP in 
conjunction with the EEP.  Some countries require 
or prefer testing of the IEP in conjunction with the 
EEP.  In others, it is written into the procedures 
and is carried out during live exercises but not 
during desktop exercises.  As a practical matter, 
resources and competence are not always 
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available for both tests to be undertaken at the 
same time.   
 Pre- and post-brief testing.  Briefing before 
exercises and a thorough debriefing afterwards are 
essential components.  If major deficiencies are 
identified during an EEP test, it is not usually re-
tested.  However, deficiencies are followed up and 
remedied.  EEPs should be live documents that are 
updated following tests. Debriefing after the 
exercise ensures that the weaker elements of the 
EEP are disposed of and the good elements are 
retained, with a record kept of the changes made 
and the reasons for them.  
 Cost of testing.  Testing emergency plans can be 
quite costly.  The recovery of costs for EEP tests 
varies between Seveso countries. Sometimes 
costs are recovered indirectly through a special 
tax on Seveso sites.  In a few countries, the 
competent authorities charge the operator for use 
of their resources in testing exercises (either a 
specific percentage or a fixed cost).  However, in a 
number of countries the competent authorities 
absorb all the costs generated from their 
participation. In one country, the local competent 
authorities can make a reduction in the cost if they 
get a training benefit from the exercise.  A few 
countries charge for the running of EEP tests.   
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2.3. Questions to assess 
emergency planning in the safety 
management system 
Inspectors should seek assurance that the measures 
foreseen in the emergency plans are appropriate.  It 
is generally not possible for the inspector to evaluate 
the adequacy of individual measures.  Rather, the 
inspector should seek evidence that emergency plans 
have been approached thoughtfully, using appropriate 
expertise and experience, and tested on a regular 
basis.  Discussions and presentations at the workshop 
included the following suggestions in regard to 
questions that could help inspectors and operators 
assess the robustness of the emergency planning 
process: 
2.3.1. Emergency response planning 
 The types of sites have the greatest risks to 
emergency response personnel? 
 Who would be exposed? 
 What is their role? 
 Do site emergency response plans describe the 
hazards to which they could be exposed? 
 
FIGURE 3: REPLICA OF EEP TEST REPORT (IRELAND) 
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 Does it appear that a good quality hazard 
consequence and escalation analysis was used as 
the basis for emergency response planning? 
 Is there a clear linkage between safety report 
scenarios and emergency response plans? 
 Have the scenarios been documented? 
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 For each scenario, has a specific timing been 
estimated from initiation to major escalation? 
 Do the plans take into account consequences and 
potential escalation within each section of the 
plant? 
 Have the critical control and protection systems 
been identified? 
 Are there reliable barriers to major escalation in 
place, i.e., passive or effective fixed active 
barriers? 
 Does each scenario have a realistic expectation 
that the incident can be controlled? 
 Is the emergency plan adequately resourced with 
the appropriate personnel and equipment?  
 Do safety reports highlight and assess the risks 
arising from emergency response? 
 Is the information adequate to assess the risks in 
an emergency? 
 Are the civil authorities involved in the planning? 
 
2.3.2. Emergency response 
implementation 
 Are the control room and ERTs aware of the 
hazard potential of the plant and activities? 
 Is there regular and meaningful communication 
and planning between site and civil response 
personnel? 
 Are critical control systems inspected and tested 
regularly and is this documented?  Critical control 
systems include detectors, ESD (emergency 
shutdown device), bunds, drains and 
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depressurisation, fixed passive and active 
protection systems, and any other instrumentation 
and barriers in place that play a role in mitigation 
and response. 
 Does planning ensure that the necessary site and 
civil emergency response personnel are readily 
available should an emergency occur? 
 
2.3.3. Emergency response exercises 
 Are the exercises based on unusual and 
challenging but also realistic scenarios? 
 Do they focus on controllable events and include 
evacuation events? 
 Do they take into account the potential for 
escalation, safety system failure and emergency 
response risks? 
 Do the exercises include an assessment of the 
risks to emergency response personnel and the 
impact of different decisions on risk? 
 Do the exercises test the relationships between 
control rooms, incident control, front line 
emergency response personnel and civil/mutual 
response?  
 
2.3.4. Testing of the emergency 
response plan   
 
 How are the objectives of the exercise selected? 
 Do the objectives take into account practical 
considerations, and different possible sequences of 
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events, including potential mitigation or response 
failures? 
 What are the criteria for selecting test scenarios?  
Do they adequately test communication between 
team members, potential risks to emergency 
responders, pathways that could lead to escalation 
of the incident, communication with the public, 
etc? 
 Are tests conducted for response to domino effect 
incidents? 
 When applicable to the site, are different types of 
scenarios tested over time (e.g., fire, explosion, 
release to the environment)? 
 Do all personnel that would be involved in the 
emergency response take part in the exercise? 
 Do the test exercises take into account lessons 
learned from previous exercises?  
 Do the test exercises require a briefing before the 
exercise and a debriefing after it takes placed? 
 Does the exercise briefing explain the purpose of 
testing the emergency plan and objectives of the 
exercise? 
 Are lessons learned from the debriefing 
documented in a revised emergency plan? 
 Are lessons learned from incidents also applied to 
similar scenarios at other installations on the site 
(internal emergency plan)? In the local area 
(external emergency plan)? 
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3. DETERMINING EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
ZONES, PUBLIC INFORMATION ZONES AND 
COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 
Emergency response planning for chemical accident 
risks requires establishing a reference scenario (or 
scenarios) for each hazardous site.  The potential 
consequences of the reference accident scenario, 
taking into consideration foreseeable variability in the 
sequence of events (e.g., night vs. day, direction of 
the impact, etc.), determine the nature of the 
response and define the area of impact (sometimes 
also called the “threat zone” or “impact zone”).  The 
reference scenario also will define the level and scope 
of the response, the logistical requirements, 
organisations involved, and the contingency strategies 
that may have to be activated.   
 
Workshops 3 and 4 aimed to find answers to the following 
specific questions in regard to defining emergency 
response zones and strategy for communication 
emergency information to the public: 
1. How is the reference accident scenario determined? 
2. How is the emergency planning threat zone 
determined? 
3. How is the public information zone be determined? 
4. What is good practice for provision of information to 
the public? 
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In addition, some Seveso countries also use reference 
accident scenarios to establish public information 
zones to fulfil the obligation under Article 14 of the 
Seveso Directive that competent authorities should 
ensure for every upper tier site that  
“all persons likely to be affected by a major 
accident receive regularly and in the most 
appropriate form, without having to 
request it, clear and intelligible information 
on safety measures and requisite 
behaviour in the event of a major 
accident.”   
This obligation raises questions as to who should be 
informed about a major accident and what kind of 
information should be communicated.   For this 
reason, some Seveso countries have used reference 
accident scenarios to establish “public information 
zones”.  Other countries rely on established protocols 
for communicating emergency information to the 
public, often delegating leadership to authorities with 
local knowledge and experience.  
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3.1. Determining the Threat Zone 
for Emergency Planning 
The internal and external emergency plans are 
defined on the basis of the area affected by the 
reference accident scenarios5 selected for the planning 
exercise, sometimes called the “threat zone”. The 
precise definition of such events is challenging in 
practice.  The approach to defining the area of impact 
for an external emergency plan varies considerably 
among the Seveso countries.   
In any case, the precise selection of appropriate 
reference scenarios is challenging in practice. In most 
Seveso countries, the emergency planning area is 
determined by using the scenarios and calculations in 
the safety report, but there is no uniform approach 
across the EU for this purpose.  Some countries have 
an explicit policy to apply a worst-case scenario 
formula for purposes of emergency planning; other 
countries use a number of other indicators in addition 
to worst-case criteria to select reference scenarios. 
                                                            
5  The workshop programme specifically uses the term “credible 
worst case accident scenario” in the session title since Seveso 
implementation of emergency response planning obligations in 
Ireland is based on this approach.  However, it was decided not to 
use this term in this publication since this approach is not 
universally applied across the Member States. 
 
60      Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 
 
Several Seveso countries have produced guidance for 
selecting emergency planning scenarios, that often 
includes recommended methods for identifying and 
ranking candidate scenarios, as well as variables that 
should be taken into consideration when determining 
emergency response measures. An example of one 
possible classification approach described at the 
workshop is depicted in Table 1.  
TABLE 1: A METHOD FOR CLASSIFYING SCENARIOS FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING
6
 
Minor most common, no real potential for 
harm 
Immediate common, operator fatality no risk of 
escalation 
Controllable occasional, major risk to ERTs 
Evacuation occasional, risk to ERTs and the 
public 
Catastrophic rare, little further risk of fatalities 
Both consequence and risk-based approaches are 
used in Seveso countries to define emergency 
planning areas, although most countries use either 
                                                            
6  Dalzell, G.  2012.  Relationship between the operator and 
emergency services. Mutual Joint Visit Workshop for Seveso 
Inspectors on Emergency Planning. Dublin, Ireland. 
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one or the other.  In addition, some countries allow 
explicit inclusion of technical measures in scenario 
development.  In particular, risk-based approaches 
can automatically account for technical measures in 
calculations to produce the risk estimates for the 
emergency planning zone.  For consequence-based 
approaches, it may be more difficult to assess which 
on-site mitigation measures should be included and as 
such, scenarios often exclude them. 
The workshop generated a number of observations 
concerning practices for establishing worst case 
accident and threat zone for emergency planning.  
There was a concern expressed that too much 
emphasis on worst-case accidents in the safety report 
sometimes results in too little emphasis on more 
frequent events, thereby increasing their risk and 
potential to escalate into a major incident.   
• Role of authorities vs. role of industry in 
selecting the reference scenarios.  In general, 
the operator is responsible for defining major 
accident scenarios in the safety report.  However, 
countries vary as to whether the operator also 
selects the reference scenario(s) for external 
emergency response planning. A few countries 
even prefer that operators in the same local area  
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Case Study (Ireland): Controlled Burn Vs. 
Extinguishment 
There are various scenarios where a fire-fighting response 
might be required, for example a fire at petroleum bulk stores 
sites, chemical warehouses or in a production plant. Typically, 
rapid fire development occurs in pool fires but development is 
much slower in warehouse fires. The more intense the fire, the 
greater the buoyancy of the plume, and (normally) the lower 
the risk to human health.   
Noting that fire protection systems are part of risk mitigation 
measures, a number of fire-fighting policies exist to guide 
emergency planning.  For example, IP 19 identifies responses at 
extremes – from total protection to burn-down – with typical 
responses falling somewhere in-between.  Controlled Burn*: 
PPG28 also provides criteria for deciding when a burn-down 
may be appropriate.   
Some key considerations include: 
 Risk to people from thermal radiation and toxic plumes 
 Impact of smoke plume  
 Potential to extinguish the fire successfully  
 Risk of fire spreading 
 Presence of important buildings in the vicinity 
 Potential impacts should fire water run off escape 
 Domino effects of any “let it burn” approach 
 Resource needs if extinguishment is required  
(see  IP 19 and National Fire Protection Association codes 
for estimated rates for foam and for water cooling)  
For more details, the reference standards should be consulted. 
*A publication of the UK government available for free 
download at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications.   
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consult together to select an appropriate scenario 
for external planning purposes.    
In some cases, scenarios for emergency planning 
may be identified as a distinct set of scenarios 
within the safety report or in a separate 
document.     
• Methodology for selecting reference 
scenarios.   Based on various criteria, the 
authority or operator will select the appropriate 
scenario(s) to define the threat zone(s).  There is 
variation among countries in the degree of liberty 
that the operator is allowed in selecting 
methodologies, endpoints (e.g., exposure levels) 
and other inputs.  Generally, regardless of how the 
selection process is defined, authorities must 
examine the outcome and review the associated 
calculations to ensure that they are consistent and 
reasonable, that the operator has used recognised 
methods, and can justify the method that has 
been chosen.   
The factors that determine the modelling 
methodology accepted by the authorities may also 
depend on whether risk or consequence-based 
approaches are preferred.  Some Seveso countries 
require that specific methods are applied to 
support authority obligations for land-use and 
emergency planning.   Indeed, some countries are 
very specific in requiring a certain approach 
(deterministic or risk-based) to select threat zone 
scenarios for emergency planning.  There are also 
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countries that prefer a consequence-based 
approach for selecting threat zone scenarios, while 
accepting or even encouraging a risk-based 
approached for safety report (i.e., SMS) scenarios.  
• The worst case scenario.  Some countries have 
adopted an approach that specifically uses the 
“worst case scenario” (or “credible worst case 
scenario”) to drive emergency planning.  The 
definition of worst case scenarios may sometimes 
differ from the definition of the scenarios selected 
by the site as a basis for the safety management 
strategy in the safety report.  For example, the 
emergency planning process may not allow 
application of technical measures for controlling or 
mitigating accident consequences of the reference 
scenario, these same measures may be assumed 
for purposes of site risk management. Guidance 
for determining the worst case scenario appears to 
be available in some Seveso countries.  
• Acceptance of mitigation measures.  In some 
Seveso countries, implementation of technical 
measures for mitigation and control are 
considered as part of the IEP only, while they will 
by default be taken into account in countries when 
risk based calculations drive scenario selection. 
For consequence-based approaches, whether 
mitigation and control measures are accepted in 
the scenario depends on expert judgement 
concerning the reliability of the measure in an 
emergency situation.  Some countries stated that 
it can be difficult to assess the reliability of on-site 
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mitigation measures outside a risk context.  Some 
authorities take the approach that technical 
mitigation measures (e.g., passive measures) are 
acceptable, but not active measures.  
• Domino effects. Reference scenarios involving 
domino effects from multiple sites are also 
considered in some countries. 
 Examples of good practice: 
 In Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, the 
local competent authorities determine the 
reference accident scenarios.   
 Denmark.  The endpoints that define threat 
zones are established in the safety report.   
 Ireland.  The endpoints defining the threat 
zones are determined as part of emergency 
planning.  The CCA expects that zones are 
established following the most conservative 
approach but does not specify what endpoints 
should be used. 
 Germany and Finland have guidance for 
selecting the reference scenario for emergency 
planning with examples of consequence based 
scenarios.   
 Netherlands.  The method for determining 
reference accident scenarios for emergency 
planning is written into regulations in the 
Netherlands.  The emergency planning 
scenarios are in a separate section of the 
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safety report from the accident scenarios 
analysed for site risk management.   
The public have access to some information 
about the reference accident scenarios for 
emergency planning.  
 Norway and Romania. The reference accident 
scenarios for emergency planning are taken 
from the safety report.  However, the worst 
case scenario is not necessarily used.   
 Portugal.  The reference accident scenarios for 
emergency planning are determined between 
operators.  This is not as common in other 
Member States. 
 Romania.  The operator decides which 
methodology to use to identify major accident 
scenarios.  It is considered advantageous to 
have more than one operator in an area to 
compare results.  Inspections are carried out 
against detailed scenario descriptions.  The 
inspection gives particular attention to 
checking that barriers meet the description in 
the scenario and can function as expected.  
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3.2. Practices for establishing the 
public information zone and 
communicating with the public 
 
The public information zone is not necessarily defined 
in the same way as the emergency planning zone.  
For example, the emergency planning zone may be 
concerned about acute human health and 
environmental impacts, whereas the public 
information zone may also include populations on the 
perimeter of emergency planning zones. Lack of 
information or flawed release of information, could 
actually cause panic or confusion among a wide 
geographic area.  In some cases, curiosity or concern 
may drive some citizens to expose themselves 
needlessly to greater risk. 
According to the workshop, Seveso countries vary in 
their approach to establishing public information 
zones.  In some countries, the operator is asked to 
propose the public information zone and other cases 
the authority, using information supplied by the 
operator, designates the zone applying a systematic 
approach define the public information zone (PIZ), 
based on consequence or risk calculations.  It 
determines the PIZ by taking account of both the 
likelihood and effects of possible major accidents at 
the establishment. It is set on the basis that people  
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FIGURE 4: EXAMPLE OF A PUBLIC INFORMATION ZONE APPLYING THE IRISH HSA 
APPROACH.  (THE OUTSIDE BORDERS OF ZONES 1, 2 AND 3 ARE MARKED BY THE 
BROWN, GOLD AND GREEN LINES RESPECTIVELY.) 
outside it are not at significant immediate risk from 
major accidents, although they could be if the 
accident escalates. The responsibility of informing the 
population in the PIZ may be allocated to any number 
of competent authorities depending on the country.  
The national authority may sometimes take the role of 
developing standardized materials with local 
communication strategy as the responsibility for local 
authorities.  
Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 69 
 
 
Communication responsibilities are also two-fold, in 
the sense that PIZ populations normally should be 
provided with information on what to do in case an 
accident occurs.  In addition, there should be a 
strategy in place that addresses all perceived 
contingencies for communicating with the PIZ 
population should such an emergency occur. 
 
The workshop highlighted the number of different 
issues surrounding establishing public information 
zones to fulfil the obligations of Article 14. 
 Methods for identifying who should receive 
information (“the public information zone” or 
PIZ).  Countries vary considerably in the 
approach to identifying the geographical area 
defining the population, the “public information 
zone”, that should be informed about the presence 
of a chemical accident risk (“persons likely to be 
affected” in Article 14).  Selecting the PIZ may be 
the responsibility of the national authority, local 
authority or operator depending on the Member 
State. Consequence-based approaches (rather 
than risk-based) are most commonly used for 
determining the PIZ. 
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In some Seveso countries, determination of the PIZ is 
related to the EEP and is based on the maximum 
consequence scenario zone.  Some countries, such as 
Ireland and the UK, have established a specific 
methodology to define the PIZ. In other countries, the 
public information area is based on information  
 
Case Study (Ireland):  Defining the Public  
 
In 2009 Ireland adopted a new approach to define the Public 
Information Zone (PIZ) in keeping with the European 
Guidelines on Land-Use Planning (LUP).  This was previously 
set on the basis of the consequences of specified events but, 
following the introduction of a risk-based LUP system, it is 
now based on risk.  Article 13.1 of the Directive 96/82/EC 
sets out the requirement for the PIZ but, importantly, the 
Directive does not elaborate further on how it is to be 
implemented. 
In Ireland, the Central Competent Authority (HSA) decides on 
the extent of the PIZ, although the operator of the 
establishment concerned may make a proposal in the draft 
Safety Report.  In determining the extent of the zone, 
consideration has been given to establishing who “the persons 
likely to be affected by a major accident” are.  Previously they 
had been identified as those within a specified consequence 
zone for a specified event, for example those within the “half 
dangerous dose” footprint following a 10 minute release of 
chlorine gas from a cylinder, in D5 weather conditions*.  
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provided by the operator and the public information  
area is determined in consultation with the local 
authority. Methodologies used for external emergency 
planning, such as Aloha and Effects, may equally be 
applied to determine PIZ’s but the results may be 
applied differently for PIZ’s than for threat zones. 
Information Zone 
 
The new method for establishing the PIZ utilizes a three-zone 
risk of fatality system, based on specified scenarios for ten 
different industry types (representative of the COMAH 
establishment population).  The outer planning risk zone, 
representing a risk of fatality of 1 in 10 million per year, is 
used to define the area containing “the persons likely to be 
affected by a major accident” i. e., the PIZ.  The PIZ is based on 
risk and not on the worst case scenario.  
 
*A dangerous dose is defined as one where there is:           
·       Severe distress to almost everyone. 
·       A substantial fraction requires medical attention, 
some suffer irreversible effects. 
·       Highly susceptible people might be killed (taken as 
~1%). 
 Weather conditions in hazard studies are generally described 
in terms of an atmospheric stability condition and a wind 
speed. D5 indicates Pasquill stability class D with a wind 
speed of 5 ms-1. 
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Participants agreed that it would be useful to have 
common general principles or “benchmarks” for 
establishing PIZs, that could then be further 
interpreted by Seveso authorities to meet local needs. 
• Determining “persons likely to be affected”.  
There was a discussion about “persons likely to be 
affected” in terms of Article 14 vs. Article 16 
(Information to be supplied by the operator and 
actions to be taken following a major accident”).  
For preparedness purposes, “persons likely to be 
affected” are defined broadly on the basis of an 
equally possible range of consequences for a given 
reference scenario. The geographic distribution 
and affected population may be much wider than if 
that accident actually were to occur, because a 
wide range of possible impacts must be taken into 
consideration to cover all possible sequences of 
events.  For post-emergency communication the 
term “likely” is not relevant with respect to the 
scenario because the accident has already 
happened and to a large extent, the geographic 
scope and severity of consequences is known.  
Rather, “likely” applies to those who are in fact 
known to be affected already.  
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• Defining the term “affected”.  Another related 
question was raised concerning the term 
“affected”.  It was suggested that definition of this 
term is subject to broad interpretation.  For 
example, in Ireland, Zone 3 of the public 
information zone is purposely defined so that it 
could possibly include those that may not be very 
much affected in human health terms, but could 
experience other impacts, such as disruption of 
local services (e.g., electrical, telephone, roads, 
etc.) or populations that are simply close enough 
distance to the impact zone to be apprehensive 
about their own situation. 
 Costs.  In some Seveso countries, the costs 
associated with determining the PIZ are included 
in the costs associated with assessing the safety 
report.  Some pass the costs onto operators while 
others do not.       
 Information to the public and the EEP: There 
seems to be a correlation between the EEP and 
the information provided to the public.  Approval  
  
74      Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards 
 
  
Case Study (France):  Providing Information to 
the Public in France: Shared Competencies 
between the Operator and the Authorities 
There are two mechanisms to deliver preventative 
information to the public in France - one regarding general 
information on major accident hazards and the other dealing 
with specific information on technological hazards.  
Furthermore there are two major tools available for general 
information, a departmental document (DDRM: Dossier 
Départemental sur les Risques Majeurs) and a local 
information document (Document d’information communal 
sur les risques majeurs) written by town council services. 
In relation to the specific information regarding technical 
hazards, the legal requirements cover: 
o Recommendations on the behaviour to adopt 
o Information on emergency measures 
o Posters in establishments where the public gathers 
(schools, museums, etc.) 
o Flyers 
o Information campaigns 
o Pen-door days at Seveso establishments 
o The state co-ordinates and controls these 
requirements and they are implemented by the 
mayors and the prefects (representing the state). 
The operator pays for its implementation. 
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of information to the public varies between Seveso 
countries and responsibility varies between the 
national authorities, local authorities and the 
operator.   
 Pre-incident information to the public. Most 
Seveso countries reported that information to the 
public should be disseminated both electronically 
and by leaflet.  It was suggested that websites 
with risk information on maps and data contained 
as part of the permit process operated by some 
countries could be used.  Citizens themselves can 
check what Seveso sites are present in their local 
area and sometimes also whether they are within 
a threat zone.  Coupled with proactive outreach, 
online communication can be advantageous 
because it can be updated regularly at  low cost 
and has potential to host a wide range of 
information.  
 Responsibility for public information.  
Approval and communication of information to be 
communicated is managed differently in Seveso 
countries, also depending on whether it is pre-
incident information or after a major accident has 
occurred.  The national authority takes a leading 
role in some countries defining the strategy and 
determining the content, particularly for pre-
incident information, but in some countries this 
responsibility is allocated to local authorities 
(which could be the municipality, the fire brigade, 
a public health office, for example) with the 
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national authority in a consultative and/or 
approval role. A number of countries reported that 
it is the responsibility of the emergency 
responders, not the CCA to communicate with the 
public during a major accident.  It appeared that 
the size of the country and the historic role of the 
national government in emergency planning may 
play a significant role in this decision. 
 Crisis communication.  A number of suggestions 
were made about the means that could be used to 
inform the public during a major accident including 
public and company alarms, TV, radio, telephone, 
Short Message Service (text) and social media. 
Online sites for communicating to the public are 
also increasingly used to communicate risk and 
preparedness information.   
 Use of sirens.  There was much discussion during 
the plenary session about the means used to 
inform the public other than a siren.  In response 
to a question about the best way to inform the 
public, it was suggested that meetings with local 
community groups and regular talks could be 
used.  In order to ensure that everyone received 
the information, the use of widespread advertising 
campaigns and information displayed in many 
locations was suggested.   
 Use of social media.  The use of social media 
(e.g., Twitter) for communicating during 
emergencies has become a global phenomenon.  
Thus far the use of social media as part of a 
communication strategy during a Seveso 
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emergency does not appear to be widespread 
among Seveso countries. During such 
emergencies, the affected people are sometimes 
told to avoid using their phones and in some cases 
the authorities may have to prevent public access 
to the mobile network.  Still, some authorities 
have tried it, with positive results in some cases, 
and less positive results in others.  Therefore, at 
the time of the workshop, it appeared that use of 
social media for public communication in Seveso 
emergencies was an isolated, rather than standard 
practice, especially since it did not appear that any 
national authorities represented at the workshop 
had adopted or tested its use for this purpose. It 
could be that this situation changes over time.  
 Examples of country practices.  
 Ireland. The CCA decides on the extent of the 
zone, although the operator of the 
establishment concerned may make a proposal 
in the draft Safety Report.  In determining the 
extent of the zone, consideration has been 
given to establishing who “the persons likely to 
be affected by a major accident” are. 
 Cyprus. The national competent authority 
determines the zones based on information 
provided by the operator. 
 France.  There are two mechanisms to deliver 
preventative information to the public in 
France - one regarding general information on 
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major accident hazards and the other dealing 
with specific information on technological 
hazards. 
Furthermore there are two major tools 
available for general information, a 
departmental document (DDRM: Dossier 
Départemental sur les Risques Majeurs) and a 
local information document (Document 
d’information communal sur les risques 
majeurs) written by town council services. 
 Netherlands.  The government uses an online 
tool (www.risicokaart.nl/en) to provide 
information about possible risks including 
accidents involving hazardous substances.  The 
tool allows the public to see the risks in their 
area by entering a post code or place of 
residence.  They can then see if there is an 
increased risk in the area e.g. an aviation 
accident, natural fires or floods and they can 
receive advice about what dangers they 
represent and how to protect themselves in an 
emergency.     
 Norway. The operator is responsible for 
providing the information for the PIZ.   
 Slovenia. The operator and the local authority 
are responsible for the PIZ. 
 Sweden. A decision about the PIZ is made in 
conjunction with the operator.  
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ANNEX 1 – MJV PROGRAMME 
Wednesday 3 October 2012 
12:30 – 
13:45 
Light lunch/Registration 
14:00 Welcome 
Dr. Sharon McGuinness, Health and Safety 
Authority 
14:05 Context of the MJV 
Maureen Wood, European Commission 
 Session 1:  Safety Management System, 
Emergency Planning and Response 
Chair: Pat Conneely, Health and Safety 
Authority 
14:15 Presentation 1  Right Hand Side of the 
Bow-Tie in Europe 
Michael de Gunst, Safety 
Region Rotterdam Area 
14:35 Presentation 2 Relationships Between 
the Operators and 
Emergency Services 
Graham Dalzell, European 
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Process Safety Centre 
14:55 Presentation 3 Planning for 
Emergencies – Dublin 
Port, a Practical Example 
Dr. Alice Doherty, Health 
and Safety Authority 
15:15 Coffee Break 
15:45 Workshop 1 Best Practice for 
Assessing the Safety 
Management System 
regarding Emergency 
Planning and Response 
16:50 -
17:30 
Reports from workshop 1 sessions, 
questions and general discussion 
18.30 Social Event - Irish Night 
 
Thursday 4 October 2012 
 Session 2: Testing of Emergency Plans and 
the Role of the Competent Authorities 
Chair: Dr. P J Claffey, Health and Safety 
Authority 
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09:15 Presentation 4 Role of the Central 
Competent Authority in 
Testing the Internal and 
External Emergency 
Plans 
Dr. Tom O’Sullivan, Health 
and Safety Authority 
09:40 Presentation 5 The External Emergency 
Plan – the Obligation to 
Regularly Test in 
Practice? 
Peter Daly, Health Service 
Executive 
10:05 Presentation 6 Practical Testing Of 
External Emergency 
Plans 
Richard Hedderman, 
Dublin Fire Brigade 
10:30 Coffee Break 
11:00 Workshop 2 Best Practice for Testing 
External Emergency 
Plans and Clarification of 
the Roles of the 
Competent Authorities 
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12:05 Reports from workshop 2 sessions, 
questions and general discussion 
13:00 Light Lunch 
 Session 3: The Public Information Area and 
Communicating with the Public 
Chair: Dr. Sharon McGuinness, Health and 
Safety Authority 
14:15 Presentation 7 Defining the Public 
Information Zone – a 
Central Competent 
Authority View 
Pat Conneely, Health and 
Safety Authority 
14:35 Presentation 8 Providing Information to 
the Public – the 
Operators Experience 
Eamon Judge, Eli Lilly S.A 
14:55 Presentation 9 Providing Information to 
the Public in 
France: Shared 
Competencies Between 
the 
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Operator and the 
Authorities 
Maud Casier, Ministry of 
Ecology 
15:15 Coffee Break 
15:45 Workshop 3 Best Practice for 
Determining the Public 
Information Zone and 
Communicating with 
the Public 
16:50 -
17:30 
Report from workshop 3 sessions, 
questions and general discussion 
19.00 Social Event - Dinner in Hotel 
 
Friday 5 October 2012 
 Session 4: The Worst Case Accident and 
Threat Zone for Emergency Planning 
Chair: Dr. P J Claffey, Health and Safety 
Authority 
09:15 Presentation 10 Maximum Credible 
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Accident 
Michael de Gunst, Safety 
Region Rotterdam Area 
09:40 Presentation 11 When a Controlled Burn 
Response Might be 
Appropriate 
Thomas Leonard/Shane 
Malone, Byrne Ó Cléirigh 
Ltd 
10:05 Presentation 12 Appropriate Endpoints 
for Modelling Worst 
Case Accidents/Threat 
Zones in the 
Emergency Planning 
Context 
Dr. Mary T. O’Mahony , 
Health Service Executive 
10:30 Coffee Break 
11:00 Workshop 4 Defining the Credible 
Worst Case Accident 
Scenario and Threat 
Zone for Emergency 
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Planning 
12:05 Reports from workshop 4 sessions, 
questions and general discussion 
12:45 Overview of MJV and concluding remarks 
Maureen Wood, European Commission 
13:00 Light Lunch 
Close of MJV 
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ANNEX 2 – PROGRAMME FOR EACH WORKSHOP 
SESSION 
Session 1 - Best practice for assessing the 
safety management system (SMS) 
regarding emergency planning and 
response 
Presentation 1 - Right Hand Side of the Bow-
Tie in Europe  
Michael de Gunst, Safety Region Rotterdam 
Area 
Presentation 2 - Relationships Between the 
Operators and Emergency Services  
Graham Dalzell, European Process Safety 
Centre 
Presentation 3 - Planning for Emergencies – 
Dublin Port, a Practical Example  
Dr. Alice Doherty, Health and Safety 
Authority 
Workshop 1 
Group 1 – Chair: Michiel Goethals, Rapporteur: 
Charlotte Lindkvist 
Group 2 – Chair: Arvid Samuelsson, Rapporteur: 
Dagmar Dräger 
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Group 3 – Chair: Norman Powell, Rapporteur: Ole 
Karsten Stubben 
 
1. How is the SMS assessed in practice with 
regard to emergency planning and response? 
 What questionnaires or checklists are used? 
 Is the SMS assessed by the competent 
authorities individually or as part of joint 
inspections? 
 Is the SMS assessed as part of emergency 
response testing? 
 What improvements can be made for more 
effective assessment of the SMS with regard to 
emergency planning and response? 
 
2. What information should be included on the 
SMS in the Major Accident Prevention Policy 
document and Safety Report with regard to 
emergency planning and response? 
 How can gaps between SMS documentation 
and emergency planning in practice be 
identified? 
 Do Safety Reports contain enough information 
for the emergency services to prepare an EEP?  
If not, how is this addressed? 
 How do operators ensure that emergency 
services are informed of significant changes at 
the establishment which may have implications 
for them and the emergency response? 
 Are exercises based on actual scenarios? 
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 How are safe locations identified for 
emergency responders? 
 
Session 2 - Best practice for testing 
external emergency plans (EEPs) and 
clarification of the roles of the competent 
authorities 
Presentation 4 - Role of the Central Competent 
Authority in Testing the Internal and External 
Emergency Plans, Dr. Tom O’Sullivan, Health 
and Safety Authority 
Presentation 5 - The External Emergency Plan 
– the Obligation to Regularly Test in Practice?, 
Peter Daly, Health Service Executive 
Presentation 6 - Practical Testing Of External 
Emergency Plans, Richard Hedderman, Dublin 
Fire Brigade 
Workshop 2 
Group 1 – Chair: Michiel Goethals, Rapporteur: 
Charlotte Lindkvist 
Group 2 – Chair: Arvid Samuelsson, Rapporteur: 
Dagmar Dräger 
Group 3 – Chair: Norman Powell, Rapporteur: Ole 
Karsten Stubben 
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1. Are the roles of each competent authority 
clear with regard to testing EEPs? 
 Does the Central Competent Authority (CCA) 
have a function other than a reporting role? 
 Does the CCA liaise with the operator on the 
interface between the internal emergency plan 
(IEP) and the EEP? 
 Are written reports prepared after EEP tests?  
If so, who is responsible for doing this? 
 Do all the competent authorities attend EEP 
tests? 
 
2. What is the best way to test EEPs? 
 Is a standard or guidance used? 
 Is the EEP tested in conjunction with the IEP? 
 Are the EEP tests live? 
 Are desktop exercises appropriate? 
 Is it appropriate to test more than one 
establishment at the same time as part of an 
EEP test i.e. domino establishments?  
 Are EEP tests based on major accident hazard 
scenarios identified in the Safety Report? 
 How are the mitigatory measures proposed by 
the establishment tested as part of the EEP? 
 If major deficiencies are identified during an 
EEP test, is it re-tested?  
 Do competent authorities re-cover the costs of 
EEP tests? 
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Session 3 - Best practice for determining 
the public information zone (PIZ) and 
communicating with the public 
Presentation 7 - Defining the Public 
Information Zone – a Central Competent 
Authority View, Pat Conneely, Health and 
Safety Authority 
Presentation 8 - Providing Information to the 
Public – the Operators Experience, Eamon 
Judge, Eli Lilly S.A 
Presentation 9 - Providing Information to the 
Public in France: Shared Competencies Between 
the Operator and the Authorities, Maud Casier, 
Ministry of Ecology 
Workshop 3 
Group 1 – Chair: Michiel Goethals, Rapporteur: 
Charlotte Lindkvist 
Group 2 – Chair: Arvid Samuelsson, Rapporteur: 
Dagmar Dräger 
Group 3 – Chair: Norman Powell, Rapporteur: Ole 
Karsten Stubben 
 
1. How should the PIZ be determined? 
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 Is there a preference for consequence over 
risk-based approaches? 
 Is any particular software preferred? 
 Does the Central Competent Authority (CCA) 
decide the PIZ (who is consulted?)? 
 What is the role of the Operator/CCA/Local 
Competent Authority (LCA)? 
 Are the costs involved passed on to the 
operator? 
 
2. What is best practice for provision of 
information to the public? 
 Who should approve the content/adequacy of 
the information provided to the public to 
ensure it is comprehensible (and correct)? 
 Has a standard format/template been used?   
 Should the information be disseminated 
electronically or by leaflet (or both)? 
 How should cross border considerations be 
taken into account? 
 Does the external emergeny plan correlate 
with the information provided to the public? 
3. Communicating with the public during a 
major accident 
 Is this the role of the CCA? 
 Are the means used to inform the public other 
than a siren considered to be acceptable? 
Session 4 - Defining the credible worst case 
accident scenario (CWCAS) and threat zone 
for emergency planning 
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Presentation 10 - Maximum Credible Accident, 
Michael de Gunst, Safety Region Rotterdam 
Area 
Presentation 11 - When a Controlled Burn 
Response Might be Appropriate, Thomas 
Leonard/Shane Malone, Byrne Ó Cléirigh 
Ltd 
Presentation 12 - Appropriate Endpoints for 
Modelling Worst Case Accidents/Threat Zones in 
the Emergency Planning Context, Dr. Mary T. 
O’Mahony , Health Service Executive 
Workshop 4 
Group 1 – Chair: Angela Moriarty, Rapporteur: 
Charlotte Lindkvist 
Group 2 – Chair: Arvid Samuelsson, Rapporteur: 
Dagmar Dräger 
Group 3 – Chair: Norman Powell, Rapporteur: Ole 
Karsten Stubben 
 
1. How is the CWCAS determined? 
 Is the Safety Report used to determine the 
CWCAS or does the Central Competent 
Authority (CCA) have pre-determined 
scenarios for each sector? 
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 What is the role of the CCA and Local 
Competent Authority (LCA) in  
o Assessment of methodologies? 
o Agreement of CWCAS? 
 Should domino effects be considered in 
CWCASs? 
 
2. How is the emergency planning threat zone 
determined? 
 Are the endpoints (thermal, toxic, 
overpressure) to be used specified by the 
CCA/LCA?   
 Is there a preference for Acute Exposure 
Guideline Levels over Emergency response 
planning Guidelines or other? 
 What factors determine the modelling 
methodology used e.g. ALOHA, Phast?   
 How is on site mitigation/implementation of 
technical measures considered? 
 Are domino sites considered? 
 What communication takes place between the 
LCA/Operator/CCA?
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on 
Title 
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Miljenka 
Kliček Croatia 
Senior Environmental 
Inspector 
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